

PowerHook:

Enabling Software-Based Power Side Channels Against AMD SEV Technologies via Transient-Execution Replay

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Transient-replay power side channels against AMD SEV VMs



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 - ⚡ **Malicious hypervisor** uses a transient-replay gadget to **amplify** and **denoise** transient power traces
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Motivation & Threat Model



Malicious
Hypervisor



Confidential VM




Malicious
Hypervisor




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



Confidential VM








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


































PowerHook: Overview











Hypervisor













































Systematic Analysis
































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a_0	$\oplus$	b_0	$=$	00_2




a	$\oplus$	b	$=$	c	Power
a_0	$\oplus$	b_0	$=$	00_2	
a_1	$\oplus$	b_1	$=$	11_2	


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






PowerHook Execution Time Across SEV Technologies





Synthetic AES-NI CPA Attack across AMD SEV



Malicious
Hypervisor


VM






Malicious
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VM






Malicious
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




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























Real-World Attack Case Study: AES-CBC Multi-Block Decryption




5 replay hook

14 output hook




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
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



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
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












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